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This study aims to provide the necessary information for reviewing social dialogue in the sea 
fisheries sector. The report identifies the national organisations on both sides of industry, and 
analyses the sector’s European organisations. Following  a brief overview of the sector’s 
economic background, the study describes the social partner organisations in all of the EU 
Member States (with the exception of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, and 
Slovakia) and then goes on to look at the relevant European organisations, focusing in particular 
on membership levels and  capacity to negotiate. The impetus for these EIRO series of studies on 
representativeness arises from the European Commission’s goal to recognise the representative 
social partner organisations to be consulted under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). In the sea fisheries sector, a joint committee was established in 1974 and the sea 
fisheries sectoral social dialogue committee was set up in 1999. 
Objectives of study  
The aim of this representativeness study is to identify the relevant national and supranational 
associational actors – that is the trade unions and employer organisations – in the field of 
industrial relations in the sea fisheries sector, and show how these actors relate to the sector’s 
European interest associations of labour and business. The impetus for this study, and for similar 
studies in other sectors, arises from the aim of the European Commission to identify the 
representative social partner associations to be consulted under the provisions of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1.41Mb PDF). Hence, this study seeks to provide 
basic information needed to set up and support sectoral social dialogue. The effectiveness of the 
European social dialogue depends on whether its participants are sufficiently representative in 
terms of the sector’s relevant national actors across the EU Member States. Hence, only European 
associations which meet this criteria will be admitted to the European social dialogue. 
Against this background, the study will first identify the relevant national social partner 
organisations in the sea fisheries sector, subsequently analysing the structure of the sector’s 
relevant European organisations, in particular their membership composition. This involves 
clarifying the unit of analysis at both the national and European level of interest representation. 
The study includes only organisations whose membership domain is ‘sector-related’ (see below). 
At both national and European levels, many associations are not considered as social partner 
organisations because they do not deal with industrial relations. Thus, there is a need for clear-cut 
criteria to differentiate social partner organisations from other associations. 
As for the national-level associations, classification as a sector-related social partner organisation 
in the context of this study implies fulfilling one of two criteria: the associations must either be  
• party to ‘sector-related’ collective bargaining; 
• a member of a ‘sector-related’ European association of business or labour that is on the 
Commission’s list of European social partner organisations consulted under Article 154 of the 
TFEU, and/or which participates in the sector-related European social dialogue. 
Using the criterion that a national association can be a social partner if it is affiliated to a 
European social partner implies that such an association may not be involved at all in industrial 
relations in its own country. This criterion may seem odd, but a national association does become 
involved in industrial relations through its membership of such a European organisation. 
Furthermore, it is important to assess whether the national affiliates to the European social partner 
organisations are engaged in industrial relations in their respective countries. Affiliation to a 
European social partner organisation and/or involvement in national collective bargaining are 
vital to the European social dialogue, since they can systematically connect the national and 
European levels. 
In terms of the selection criteria for the European organisations, this report 
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• includes those sector-related European social partner organisations that are on the 
Commission’s list of consultation. 
• considers any other European association with sector-related national social partner 
organisations – as defined above – under its umbrella.  
Thus, the aim to identify the sector-related national and European social partner organisations 
applies both a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach. 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this study, the sea fisheries sector is defined in terms of the Statistical 
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE), to ensure the cross-
national comparability of the findings. More specifically, the sea fisheries sector is defined as 
embracing NACE (Rev. 2) 03.11.  
This includes the following activities: 
NACE Rev.2 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
03.11 Marine Fishing 
 
The domains of the trade unions and employer organisations and scope of the relevant collective 
agreements are likely to vary from this precise NACE demarcation. The study therefore includes 
all trade unions, employer organisations and multi-employer collective agreements which are 
‘sector-related’ in terms of any of the following four aspects or patterns: 
• congruence – the domain of the organisation or scope of the collective agreement must be 
identical to the NACE demarcation, as specified above; 
• sectionalism – the domain or scope covers only a certain part of the sector, as defined by the 
aforementioned NACE demarcation, while no group outside the sector is covered; 
• overlap – the domain or scope covers the entire sector along with parts of one or more other 
sectors. However, it is important to note that the study does not include general associations 
which do not deal with sector-specific matters; 
• sectional overlap – the domain or scope covers part of the sector plus (parts of) one or more 
other sectors. 
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Figure 1: Sector relatedness of social partner organisations: domain patterns 
 
Figure 1: Sector relatedness of social partner organisations: domain patterns 
 
 
Table 1: Domain pattern and scope of the organisation’s domain 
Domain pattern Domain of organisation within the 
sector 
Domain of organisation outside 
the sector 
 Does the union/employer 
organisation’s domain embrace 
potentially all employees in the sea 
fisheries sector? 
Does the union/employer 
organisation also represent 
members outside the sea fisheries 
sector? 
Congruence (C) Yes No 
Sectionalism (S) No No 
Overlap (O) Yes Yes 
Sectional overlap (SO) No Yes 
Note: The domain pattern results from the answers to the questions on the scope of 
the domain derived in Table 5 in the annex.  
At European level, the European Commission established a Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee 
for the sea fisheries sector in 1999, while a joint committee was established in 1974. The 
Association of national organisations of fishing enterprises in the EU (Europêche) and the sea 
fishing-related organisations on the FISH Working Group of COPA-COGECA (Committee of 
Professional Agricultural Organisations-General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the 
European Union) on the employer side, as well as the European Transport Workers' Federation 
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(ETF) on the employee side, participate in the sector’s European social dialogue. Thus, affiliation 
to one of these European organisations is a sufficient criterion for classifying a national 
association as a social partner organisation for the purpose of this study. However, it should be 
noted that the constituent criterion is one of sector-related membership. This is important, in 
particular, in the case of the ETF, which covers many other sectors. Thus, the study will include 
only the organisations affiliated to ETF which are related to the sea fisheries sector in terms of 
worker representation and especially collective bargaining, following the definition of ‘sector-
relatedness’ illustrated above. It should be noted here that the COPA-COGECA FISH Working 
Group also covers aquaculture. However, sea fisheries issues are treated only by representantives 
of the relevant organisations, which in fact all belong to COGECA. Therefore, in the following 
text only reference to COGECA will be made. 
Collection of data 
The collection of quantitative data, such as those on membership, is essential for investigating the 
representativeness of the social partner organisations. Unless cited otherwise, this study draws on 
the country studies provided by the EIRO national centres. The EIRO correspondents were 
provided with standardised questionnaires in both Word and Excel format by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), which they 
completed through contacting the sector-related social partner organisations in their countries. 
The contact is generally made via telephone interviews, but might also – in certain cases – be 
established via email. In case of non-availability of any representative, the national 
correspondents are asked to fill out the relevant questionnaire based on secondary sources, such 
as information given on the social partner’s website, or derived from previous research studies. 
It is often difficult to find precise quantitative data. In such cases, the EIRO national centres are 
requested to provide rough estimates rather than leaving a question blank, given the practical and 
political relevance of this study. However, if there is any doubt over the reliability of an estimate, 
this will be noted. 
In principle, quantitative data may stem from three sources, namely: 
• official statistics and representative survey studies; 
• administrative data, such as membership figures provided by the respective organisations, 
which are then used for calculating the density rate on the basis of available statistical figures 
on the potential membership of the organisation; 
• personal estimates made by representatives of the respective organisations. 
While the data sources of the labour market and economic figures cited in the report are generally 
official statistics (and mainly EUROSTAT or national statistical offices), the figures for the 
organisations are usually either administrative data or estimates. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that several country studies also present data on trade unions and business associations that do not 
meet the above definition of a sector-related social partner organisation, in order to give a 
complete picture of the sector’s associational ‘landscape’. For the above substantive reasons, as 
well as for methodological reasons of cross-national comparability, such trade unions and 
business associations will not be considered in this overview report. Yet, these organisations can 
still be found in the national contributions, which will be published together with the overview 
report. 
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Quality assurance 
In order to assure the quality of the information gathered, several verification procedures have 
been put in place. 
• Staff of  Eurofound, together with the author of this report, checked the figures provided for 
consistency, and ensured the organisations listed met the criteria for the scope of this study 
(see above). 
• Eurofound sent the national contributions to national members of the governing board, as well 
as to the European-level sector-related social partners’ organisations. The peak-level 
organisations then asked their affiliates to verify the information. Feedback received from the 
sector-related organisations was then taken into account, if it was in line with the 
methodology of the study. 
• The complete study was finally evaluated by the European-level sectoral social partners and 
Eurofound’s Advisory Committee on Industrial Relations, which consists of representatives 
from both sides of industry, governments and the European Commission. 
Structure of report 
The study consists of three main parts, beginning with a brief summary of the sector’s economic 
background. The report then analyses the relevant social partner organisations in all EU Member 
States, with the exception of Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, 
where no activities in the sector where reported.In this respect, it should be noted that, in the 
absence of sea fisheries activities, some of these countries reported on freshwater fishing and 
aquaculture (that is, Section 3 of the NACE Rev. 2 classification of activities). These countries 
are Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Details on industrial relations in these 
countries can be found in the individual national reports. Since it was not possible to prepare a 
national report for Bulgaria, only limited information could be collected on this country 
The third part of the analysis considers the representative associations at European level. 
Each section will contain a brief introduction explaining the concept of representativeness in 
greater detail, followed by the study findings. As representativeness is a complex issue, it requires 
separate consideration at national and European level. This is because the method applied by 
national regulations and practices to capture representativeness has to be taken into account. 
Furthermore, the national and European organisations differ in their tasks and scope of activities. 
The concept of representativeness must therefore be suited to this difference. 
Finally, it is important to note the difference between the research and political aspects of this 
study. While providing data on the representativeness of the organisations under consideration, 
the report does not reach any definite conclusion on whether the representativeness of the 
European social partner organisations and their national affiliates is sufficient for admission to the 
European social dialogue. The reason for this is that defining criteria for adequate 
representativeness is a matter for political decision rather than an issue of research analysis. 
Economic background 
Data on marine fishing activities in European countries are available up to 2008. Consequently, 
there are only some projections and estimates concerning the effects of the recent economic crisis 
on the sector. 
In 2007, the European countries represented around 4.6% of global fisheries and aquaculture 
production, which made it the fourth biggest producer worldwide. Within the EU, the three 
largest producers in terms of volume were Spain, France and the United Kingdom. In general, in 
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the last 20 years, total EU production decreased slightly compared to previous years. With regard 
to fishing production, EU countries accounted for almost 6% of total worldwide production 
. In 2007 production declined compared to the previous years. At this time, the leading countries 
in fisheries activities were: 
• Spain (14.3% of total volume of catches); 
• Denmark (12.7%); 
• the UK (12%); 
• France (10.9%).  
As for aquaculture production, in 2007 its share of worldwide production was 2.6% in terms of 
volume, and 5.1% in terms of value. The main producers in terms of volume were:  
• Spain (21.7% of total production); 
• France (18.1%); 
• Italy (13.8%); 
• the UK (13.3%).  
Finally, the total value of the output of fish processing activities amounted, in 2007, to around 
EUR 23 billion (three times the turnover of the catch sector). According to Facts and figures on 
the Common Fisheries Policy, published in 2010 by the European Union (4.62Mb PDF) the 
leading countries were Spain, Italy, France and the UK. 
The above document also shows that, during the period 2002–2009, the capacity of the EU 
fishing fleet has declined at the annual rate of around 2%, in terms of both tonnage and engine 
power. Despite the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, there were 84,909 vessels in September 
2009 (21,000 fewer than in 1995). Greece has the largest number of fishing vessels, although they 
are, on average, smaller than those of most other EU countries. In 2008, the countries with the 
largest number of fishing vessels were: 
• Greece (21%); 
• Spain (13%); 
• Italy (16%).  
In particular, the largest shares of the total power installed were in: 
• Italy (17%); 
• France (16%); 
• Spain (15%), which also had the biggest total tonnage (25%).  
According to the 2010 Annual Economic Report on the European Fishing Fleet, published by the 
European Commission Joint Research Centre (4.1Mb PDF), most fishing enterprises (around 
90%) owned a single fishing vessel, while around 8% of companies owned between two and five 
vessels. According to the same report, the recent economic crisis has negatively affected the 
sector in 2009 and 2010. A number of projections and analysis on empirical data suggest that 
many companies who have also been hit by the recent fluctuation in fuel prices are struggling to 
survive. Although the situation varies from one country to another, in general, projections show 
further reductions in fleet capacity and employment. 
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Employment characteristics 
The EU fisheries industry is the fourth largest in the world. Despite the negative effects of the 
recent economic crisis, fisheries, processing and aquaculture activities provide around 350,000 
jobs in European countries. In particular, employment in marine fishing activities, measured in 
full-time equivalents (FTEs), is concentrated, according to 2007 data, in the following countries:  
• Greece (24,800 FTEs); 
• Italy (25,500); 
• Spain (35,300) 
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, sectoral employment is characterised by the prevalence of male 
workers. In 2009, the countries for which data are available show women reaching 20% of the 
overall workforce only in Belgium and Greece.. Moreover, the substantial amount of self-
employment appears as an additional sectoral key feature. In many cases, self-employed workers 
represent the majority of the sectoral workforce, and almost invariably they are a quite significant 
share of total workers. The only notable exceptions are Italy, Latvia and Portugal, where self-
employed fishermen do not reach two-digit figures. 
National level of interest representation 
In many Member States, statutory regulations explicitly refer to the concept of representativeness 
when assigning certain rights of interest representation and public governance to trade unions 
and/or employer organisations. The most important rights addressed by such regulations include:  
• formal recognition as a party to collective bargaining; 
• extension of the scope of a multi-employer collective agreement to employers not affiliated to 
the signatory employer organisation; 
• participation in public policy and tripartite bodies of social dialogue.  
Under these circumstances, representativeness is normally measured by the strength of the 
organisations’ membership. For instance, statutory extension provisions usually allow for 
extension of collective agreements to unaffiliated employers only when the signatory trade union 
and employer association represent 50% or more of the employees within the agreement’s 
domain.  
As outlined, the representativeness of the national social partner organisations is of interest to this 
study in terms of the capacity of their European umbrella organisations for participation in 
European social dialogue. Hence, the role of the national actors in collective bargaining and 
public policy-making constitutes another important component of representativeness. The 
effectiveness of European social dialogue tends to increase with the growing ability of the 
national affiliates of the European organisations to regulate the employment terms and to 
influence national public policies affecting the sector. A cross-national comparative analysis 
shows a generally positive correlation between the bargaining role of the social partners and their 
involvement in public policy (Traxler, 2004). Social partner organisations that are engaged in 
multi-employer bargaining are incorporated in state policies to a significantly greater extent than 
their counterparts in countries where multi-employer bargaining is lacking. This can be attributed 
to the fact that only multi-employer agreements matter in macroeconomic terms, setting an 
incentive for the governments to seek the cooperation of the social partner organisations. If 
single-employer bargaining prevails in a country, none of the collective agreements will have a 
noticeable effect on the economy due to their limited scope. As a result, the basis for generalised 
tripartite policy concertation will be absent. 
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In summary, representativeness is a multi-dimensional concept that embraces three basic 
elements: 
• the social partners’ membership domain; 
• their strength; 
• their recognised role in collective bargaining as in public policymaking.  
Membership domains and strength 
The membership domain of an organisation, as formally established by its constitution or name, 
distinguishes its potential members from other groups which the organisation does not claim to 
represent. As already explained, this study considers only organisations whose domain relates to 
the sea fisheries sector. However, there is insufficient room in this report to delineate the domain 
demarcations of all the organisations. Instead, the report notes how they relate to the sector by 
classifying them according to the four patterns of ‘sector-relatedness’, as specified earlier. A 
more detailed description of how an organisation may relate to the sector can be found in Figure 1 
and in the annex. 
Regarding membership strength, a differentiation exists between strength, in terms of the absolute 
number of members, and strength in relative terms. Research usually refers to relative 
membership strength as the density – in other words, the ratio of actual to potential members. 
Furthermore, a difference also arises between trade unions and employer organisations in relation 
to measuring membership strength. Trade union membership simply means the number of 
unionised persons. However, in this context, a clarification of the concept of ‘member’ should be 
made. Whereas in most countries recorded membership includes both employees and members 
who are not in active employment (such as unemployed persons and retired workers) some 
countries provide information on employed membership only. Hence, two measures of trade 
union density have to be defined: gross union density (including inactive members) and net union 
density (referring to employed union members only). In addition to taking the total membership 
of a trade union as an indicator of its strength, it is also reasonable to break down this 
membership total according to gender. 
Measuring the membership strength of employer organisations is more complex since they 
organise collective entities, namely companies with employees. In this case, therefore, two 
possible measures of membership strength may be used – one referring to the companies 
themselves, and the other to the employees working in the member companies.  
For a sector study such as this, measures of membership strength of both the trade unions and 
employer organisations have also to consider how the membership domains relate to the sector. If 
a domain is not congruent with the sector demarcation, the organisation’s total density, that is the 
density referring to its overall domain, may differ from sector-specific density, that is the 
organisation’s density referring to the sector. This report will first present the data on the domains 
and membership strength of the trade unions and will then consider those of the employer 
organisations. 
To summarise, this report basically distinguishes between three types of organisational densities, 
as defined in the following table, which are – depending on data availability – also broken down 
into net and gross rates. 
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Table 2: Definition of organisational density figures 
Type of density Definition Breakdown 
Domain density 
Number of employees 
(companies) organised by the 
organisation in the sea 
fisheries sector divided by 
total number of employees 
(companies) included in the 
organisation’s membership 
domain 
Net and gross; Employees (for 
trade unions); Companies and 
employees (for employer 
organisations) 
Sectoral density 
Number of employees 
(companies) organised by the 
organisation in the sea 
fisheries sector divided by 
total number of employees 
(companies) in the sector. 
Net and gross; Employees (for 
trade unions); Companies and 
employees (for employer 
organisations) 
Sectoral domain density 
Number of employees 
(companies) organised by the 
organisation in the sea 
fisheries sector divided by 
total number of employees 
(companies) in the sea 
fisheries sector as demarcated 
by the organisation’s domain 
Net and gross; Employees (for 
trade unions); Companies and 
employees (for employer 
organisations) 
Trade unions 
Tables 6 and 7 present the trade union data on their domains and membership strength. The tables 
list all trade unions which meet at least one of the two criteria for classification as a sector-related 
social partner organisation, as defined earlier. The majority of the 22 countries included in the 
study record at least one sector-related trade union. The exceptions essentially concern countries 
where the sector is very small and/or is dominated by self-employed workers, sometimes also due 
to special sector regulations. These countries include: 
• Cyprus, where the sector included only 115 firms in 2009, of which 104 were self-employed 
workers, while the other 11 firms employed, on average, two people; 
• Malta, with a similar situation of prevalent self-employment and a significant presence of 
cooperative work, with no collective bargaining; 
• Estonia and Lithuania, where no sector-related industrial relations are present; 
• Finland, where only an interest organisation is present (the Finland’s Fisheries’ League, 
SAKL) which mostly associates self-employed workers. The collective agreement of the 
Cargoship Association and the Finnish Seamen’s Union (SM-U) is applied to the few 
employees present in the sector (116 estimated in 2009). 
• Sweden, where there is a similar single interest organisation, the Swedish Fishermen 
Association, (SFR) and no industrial relations are in place, due to the predominant role of 
self-employed workers in the sector. 
• Greece, where there are no collective bargaining and industrial relations, despite the presence 
of a quite complex system of trade unions centred around the Hellenic Fishermen 
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Confederation, which is considered the peak interest organisation for Greek fishermen by 
laws 1361/83 and 2538/97, which regulate the sector. In fact, these trade unions have a 
general role in providing support to fishermen and not a representation role in collective 
bargaining. 
In total, 45 sector-related trade unions could be identified. Of the 44 organisation for which 
information could be collected, two (5%) have demarcated their domain in a way which is 
congruent with the sector definition. This low proportion underscores the fact that statistical 
definitions of business activities rather differ from the lines along which employees identify 
common interests and band together in trade unions. It should be noted here that the Bulgarian 
Seamen’s Syndicate is excluded from the calculations because no information on the membership 
domain could be collected. It is only known that it organises and represents fishers involved in 
high seas industrial fisheries (Source: ETF). Domain demarcations resulting in overlap in relation 
to the sector occur in 27 (or 61%) of the cases. This is the commonest situation in the sea fisheries 
sector. Overlap generally arises from two different modes of demarcation. The first one refers to 
general (cross-sectoral) domains (such as ver.di in Germany). The second mode in the sector 
relates to various forms of multi-sector domains, covering contiguous sectors, frequently in the 
broader agriculture segment of the economy (such as Flai-Cgil in Italy) or in the transport 
industry (such as RMT in the UK or FGTE-CFDT in France). Sectional overlaps involve 11 
(trade unions 25%). This mode usually emanates from domain demarcations which focus on 
certain categories of employees which are then organised across several or all sectors. Employee 
categories are specified by various parameters, such as distinct occupations (such as engineers or 
officers in the case of the Portuguese SEMM and OFICIASMAR), and geographic region (such 
as. FGAMT-CIG and ELA of Spain, which are each active only in Galicia and the Basque 
Country respectively). Finally, sectionalism, which ensues from the existence of sector-specific 
trade unions, which represent and organise only certain categories of employees in the sector, can 
be found in four cases (9%). These include, for instance, STPN and STPDC in Portugal, where 
they cover the North of the country and the district of Coimbra (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Sea fisheries sector-related trade unions and their domain patterns (N=44) 
  
Figure 3: Sea fisheries sector-related trade unions and their domain patterns (N=44) 
Source: EIRO national contributions (2011) 
As the domains of the trade unions often overlap with the demarcation of the sector, so do their 
domains with one another in the case of those countries with a pluralist trade union ‘landscape’ in 
the sea fisheries sector. Table 6 also shows these inter-union domain overlaps. Inter-union 
overlaps of domains are endemic. In all countries with more than one sector-related trade union, 
the domain of any of them overlaps with the domain of all or most of the others. Depending on 
the scale of mutual overlap, this results in competition for members. Inter-union competition is 
recorded in some countries, such as Belgium, France, Italy (in part), and Portugal. In many cases, 
however, trade unions cooperate in joint collective bargaining at sectoral and decentralised levels. 
On average, female employees represent a minority of trade union members in the unions covered 
by this study (with a simple mean of 35%), but the information is available only in a minority of 
cases (13). 
Membership of the sector-related trade unions is voluntary in all cases of the Member States 
under consideration. 
The absolute numbers of trade union members differ widely, ranging from about 2.2 million (in 
the case of Germany’s ver.di) to less than one hundred. This considerable variation reflects 
differences in the size of the economy and the comprehensiveness of the membership domain as 
well the small size of the sea fisheries sector in most of the EU countries, rather than the ability to 
attract members. 
Certainly, density is the measure of membership strength which is more appropriate for a 
comparative analysis. In this context it should be noted that density figures in this section refer to 
net ratios, which means that they are calculated on the basis of active employees, rather than 
including union members who are not in work. This is mainly because union densities are more 
informative compared to gross densities, since they better reflect the capacity to represent 
workers in their relationship to employers and also because the latter depends on the decision to 
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extend membership beyond active workers, which can vary considerably across countries and 
national models of union representation. 
Membership rates (of active workers) are available for almost 30 of the sector-related 
organisations. Domain density (27 cases) tends to be relatively low at 15%, with eight unions 
under 5% and six above 20%. For density rates, if a range of values was given instead of an exact 
figure, calculations used the lowest value. For instance, for the 0%–9% range, 0% was used, and 
for the 10%–25% class, 10% was used. Compared with their overall domain densities, the sector-
related trade unions’ density in the sea fisheries sector tends to be significantly lower with a mean 
of 5% (28 cases). 
In fact, when looking at sector density (again referring only to active members), it is important to 
differentiate between the trade unions’ sectoral density on the one hand and their sectoral domain 
density on the other. Whereas the former measures the ratio of the total number of members of a 
trade union in the sector to the number of employees in the sector (as demarcated by the NACE 
classification), the latter indicates the total number of members of a trade union in the sector in 
relation to the number of employees who work in that part of the sector as covered by the union 
domain, see Table 2. This means that the sectoral domain density must be higher than the 
sectoral density if a trade union organises only a particular part of the sector – that is where the 
trade union’s membership domain is either sectionalist or sectionalistically overlapping in 
relation to the sector. 
When taking the trade unions’ sectoral domain density into account, the trade unions’ density in 
the sea fisheries sector tends to be lower compared with the density ratio referring to their domain 
on aggregate, down from a simple mean of 15% (27 cases) to 6% (12 cases). Such relative 
weakness of trade unions in the sea fisheries sector appears to be linked to the specificity of the 
sector, which shows a prevalence of self-employed workers and a consequent low union 
representation and collective bargaining, so that there are also cases where the sector-related 
unions do not have, in fact, any members in the sea fisheries sector. This happens, for instance, in 
the UK, Romania, and in Slovenia. It should be noted that in Romania and Slovenia the relevant 
unions do indeed sign a sectoral agreement which is applied to sea fisheries, even if it has a 
broader scope, ‘Agriculture, aquaculture and fisheries’ in Romania and ‘Agriculture and the food-
processing industry’ in Slovenia. 
Employer organisations 
Tables 8 and 9 present the membership data for the employer organisations in the sea fisheries 
sector. As is the case of the trade union side, for the majority of the 22 countries under 
consideration at least one sector-related employer organisation is documented, with the exception 
of Bulgaria, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania. In these countries no significant industrial relations 
activities in the sea fisheries sector are recorded, with the exclusion of Latvia, where the presence 
of company-level bargaining was reported. No information could be collected on sector-related 
industrial relations in Bulgaria. According to the report Fisheries in Bulgaria by the Directorate-
General for Internal Policies for the European Parliament, ‘“There are no producer”. 
organisations in Bulgaria in the sense of the European legislation (Regulation EC 104/2000). 
Nevertheless, there are several fishermen or fish producers’ associations with a status of NGOs” 
(p. 38). None of the organisations mentioned in the report is affiliated to Europêche or COGECA 
In at least ten of the countries where sector-related organisations are present, a proportion of the 
listed employer/business organisations are not a party to collective bargaining (see Table 9). 
According to our selection criteria outlined above, only the organisations affiliated to Europêche 
and COGECA, the EU-level sectoral employer association, are considered in the study. As 
mentioned before, more employer associations may be included in national reports, but they are 
excluded in this study because neither are party to national sector-related collective bargaining 
(the bottom-up approach) nor are they affiliates of the relevant EU-level organisations. 
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Eight of the 17 countries, for which employer associations were identified, have one or more 
employer organisations engaged in sector-related collective bargaining. The remaining nine cases 
include five countries where no collective bargaining takes place (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Sweden 
and UK) and four countries in which collective bargaining takes place at company level 
(Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Spain), although information on the effective extent of collective 
bargaining is lacking in Ireland and Spain. 
Generally, business interest organisations may also deal with interests other than those related to 
industrial relations. Organisations specialising in matters other than industrial relations are 
commonly defined as ‘trade associations’ (see TN0311101S). Such sector-related trade 
associations also exist in the sea fisheries sector. In terms of their national scope of activities, all 
of the associations, which are not involved in collective bargaining according to Table 9, either 
primarily or exclusively act as trade associations in their country. It is the conceptual decision to 
include all associational affiliates to Europêche or COGECA, regardless of whether they have a 
role in national bargaining, which gives them the status of a social partner organisation within the 
framework of this study. At least 14 of the 36 employer/business organisations listed in Tables 8 
and 9, belong to this group. 
In nine of the 18 countries for which information on the sector-related associational landscape is 
given, only one single employer has been identified (Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Sweden). A single representation pattern is therefore equally 
important as a pluralist representation landscape in the sector on the employers’ side, while on the 
trade unions’ front there were only six countries, out of 15, with single representation. This 
feature probably reflects the already underlined relatively small size and rather homogeneous 
nature of the sector, usually centred around small-owners and self-employed fishermen. 
The employer organisations’ domains tend to be narrower than those of the trade unions (Figure 
4). First, the two types of overlap cover 42% of cases for which the relevant information is 
available, compared with almost 90% in the case of unions. Congruence is more present as it 
concerns 17% of employer organisations instead of 5% of trade unions; similarly, sectionalism 
involves 41% of cases compared to 98%. This pattern is essentially linked to two features of 
employer representation. Trade associations tend to focus on quite specific economic activities, 
since they essentially act in the political arena and they can benefit from relatively high 
specialisation in terms of more homogeneous interests and clearer objectives. However, in the 
case of sea fisheries (but even if we consider the broader fisheries and aquaculture industry) the 
relatively narrow sectoral definition can favour the presence of overlapping representational 
domains, especially in the case of organisations covering the broad agriculture sector. In fact, the 
two types of overlap involve half of all employer organisations. 
Representation of different sizes or forms lead to either sectionalism or sectional overlap, 
depending on the sectoral scope of representation. The most evident case of sectional overlap in 
the sector refers to the representation of cooperative companies in Italy, where a number of 
employer associations cover the cooperative sector in whole of the fisheries and aquaculture 
sector or even in agriculture.  
Among the employer organisations covered by this study, the Slovenian SCAF has mandatory 
membership. However, this applies only above certain size thresholds. 
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Figure 3: Sea fisheries sector-related employer organisations/business associations and 
their domain patterns (N=30) 
 
Figure 5: Sea fisheries sector-related employer organisations/business associations and 
their domain patterns (N=30) 
Source: EIRO national contributions (2011) 
In those countries with a pluralist structure in relation to employer organisations, these 
associations have often managed to form collaborative relationships. In fact, they often jointly 
negotiate on multi-employer agreements.  
As the figures on density show (Table 9), membership strength in terms of companies widely 
varies with regard to both the membership domain in general and the sector-related densities. The 
same holds true of the densities in terms of employees. In general, both the domain and the 
sectoral domain densities in terms of companies tend to be a lot lower than the densities in terms 
of employees. This reflects the usual higher propensity of the larger companies to associate, as 
compared to their smaller counterparts. 
The overall domain densities, in terms of employees of the employer/business organisations in the 
sector, tend to be higher compared with trade union densities (see above). For the associations for 
which related data are available (15 cases), it is not unusual to register a sectoral density higher 
than 50%. This refers to six organisations, that is 20% of all listed employer associations. In 
general, the findings suggest that in the sea fisheries sector the employers are well organised in 
terms of both companies and employees represented. The average sectoral density in terms of 
companies is 23% (20 cases) and it reaches 42% when employees are taken into account (15 
cases). It must be underlined, however, that, since the employer/business association density data 
are available only for a limited number of countries, the data set should again be treated 
cautiously. 
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Collective bargaining and its actors 
The small size and the prevalence of the self-employed and fishermen’s cooperatives significantly 
influences the features of collective bargaining in the sea fisheries sector. In a significant number 
of countries, collective agreements do not seem to be the main regulatory tool defining the terms 
and conditions of employment. Union representation and collective bargaining are certainly 
important in the larger and more organised undertakings, like those which engage in high-sea 
fishing. As a consequence, company bargaining also tends to prevail in cases where the 
traditional bargaining structure is centred on industry-wide agreements. 
Tables 7 and 9 list respectively all of the trade unions and the employer associations which 
engage in sector-related collective bargaining. The data presented in Table 10 provide an 
overview of the system of sector-related collective bargaining in the 22 countries under 
consideration. The importance of collective bargaining as a means of employment regulation is 
measured by calculating the total number of employees covered by collective bargaining, as a 
proportion of the total number of employees within a certain segment of the economy (Traxler et 
al., 2001). Accordingly, the sector’s rate of collective bargaining coverage is defined as the ratio 
of the number of employees covered by any kind of collective agreement to the total number of 
employees in the sector. 
To delineate the bargaining system, two further indicators are used: The first indicator refers to 
the relevance of multi-employer bargaining, compared with single-employer bargaining. Multi-
employer bargaining is defined as being conducted by an employer organisation on behalf of the 
employer side. In the case of single-employer bargaining, the company, or its divisions, is the 
party to the agreement. This includes the cases where two or more companies jointly negotiate an 
agreement. The relative importance of multi-employer bargaining, measured as a percentage of 
the total number of employees covered by a collective agreement, therefore provides an 
indication of the impact of the employer organisations on the overall collective bargaining 
process.  
The second indicator considers whether statutory extension schemes have been applied to the 
sector. For reasons of brevity, this analysis is confined to extension schemes which widen the 
scope of a collective agreement to employers not affiliated to the signatory employer 
organisation; extension regulations targeting the employees are therefore not included in the 
research. Regulations concerning the employees are not significant to this analysis for two 
reasons. On the one hand, extending a collective agreement to the employees who are not 
unionised in the company covered by the collective agreement is a standard practice of the ILO, 
aside from any national legislation. Secondly, employers have good reason to extend a collective 
agreement concluded by them, even when they are not formally obliged to do so; otherwise, they 
would set an incentive for their workforce to unionise.  
In comparison with employee-related extension procedures, schemes that target the employers are 
far more significant for the strength of collective bargaining in general and multi-employer 
bargaining in particular. This is because the employers are capable of refraining from both joining 
an employer organisation and entering single-employer bargaining in the context of a purely 
voluntaristic system. Therefore, employer-related extension practices increase the coverage of 
multi-employer bargaining. Moreover, when it is pervasive, an extension agreement may 
encourage more employers to join the controlling employer organisation; such a move then 
enables them to participate in the bargaining process and to benefit from the organisation’s 
related services in a situation where the respective collective agreement will bind them in any 
case (Traxler et al., 2001). 
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Collective bargaining coverage 
In terms of the sector’s collective bargaining coverage, six of the 16 countries for which related 
data are available, record a very high coverage rate of 80% or higher (Belgium, Finland, France, 
Italy, Portugal and Romania); with four of them recording coverage rates of (practically) 100%. 
Conversely, there are six countries where no collective bargaining is reported (Cyprus, Greece, 
Lithuania, Malta, Sweden, and the UK). In the remaining countries, we find three cases of 
industry-wide bargaining and relatively high coverage rates (ranging from about 50% to 70%): 
Denmark, Netherlands and Slovenia, and one case of single-employer bargaining and lower 
coverage rates: Germany (15%). For four more countries, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Spain, the 
presence of single-employer agreements was reported, but no indication on collective bargaining 
coverage could be made. 
These findings show a significant polarisation between countries where collective bargaining 
plays an important role and those where no collective agreements are in place. Some basic feature 
of bargaining systems seem to influence the presence of high coverage rates, like the prevalence 
of sectoral bargaining and the utilisation of extension practices. Also the existence of well-
established national industrial relations systems can play a role. However, in the case of sea 
fisheries, the structural characteristics of the sector seem to be more important to sustain the 
presence of collective bargaining, like the absolute size of the sector, the presence of small - 
medium-to-large size companies, and the share of employees in overall employment. 
Extension procedures are not widely used in the sector, even if they could be (such as in France, 
and Slovenia). They are used in Belgium, Finland, and Romania. A functional equivalent to 
statutory extension schemes can be found in Italy. According to the country’s constitution, 
minimum conditions of employment must apply to all employees. The country’s labour court 
rulings relate this principle to the multi-employer agreements, to the extent that they are regarded 
as generally binding.  
Participation in public policymaking 
Interest associations may participate in public policy in two basic ways: 
• they may be consulted by the authorities on matters affecting their members; 
• they may be represented in tripartite committees and boards of policy concertation.  
This study considers only cases of tripartite consultation and participation which explicitly relate 
to sector-specific matters. Consultation processes are not necessarily institutionalised and, 
therefore, the organisations consulted by the authorities may vary according to the issues to be 
addressed and also over time, depending on changes in government. Moreover, the authorities 
may initiate a consultation process on an occasional rather than a regular basis. Given this 
variability, in Tables 7 and 9 only those sector-related trade unions and employer organisations 
are flagged that are usually consulted. 
Trade unions 
Trade unions are regularly consulted by the authorities in at least 13 of the 15 countries where 
sector-related trade unions are recorded. Two countries cite a lack of regular consultation of any 
of the trade unions (Portugal and the UK). In most countries with a multi-union system where a 
noticeable practice of consultation is observed, all the existing trade unions take part in the 
consultation process. 
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012 
18 
 
Employer organisations 
The great majority of the sector-related employer/business organisations for which related data 
are available are involved in consultation procedures. Only in three countries (Cyprus, Greece, 
and Portugal) are no employer associations consulted on sector-related policies. 
Tripartite participation 
Turning from consultation to tripartite participation, the findings reveal that a sector-specific 
tripartite body has been established in several countries (see Table 11). They are mostly bodies 
with general competencies on sectoral policies. Sometimes they cover the whole of the 
agriculture sector, with subcommittees on fisheries. Such bodies are established in Belgium, 
Estonia, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. 
European level of interest representation 
At a European level, eligibility for consultation and participation in the social dialogue is linked 
to three criteria, as defined by the European Commission. Accordingly, a social partner 
organisation must have the following attributes: 
• be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories, and be organised at European 
level;  
• consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised part of Member 
States’ social partner structures and which have the capacity to negotiate agreements, as well 
as being representative of all Member States, as far as possible;  
• have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation process.  
Regarding social dialogue, the constituent feature is the ability of such organisations to negotiate 
on behalf of their members and to conclude binding agreements. Accordingly, this section on 
European associations of the sea fisheries sector will analyse these organisations’ membership 
domain, the composition of their membership and their ability to negotiate. 
As outlined in greater detail below, one sector-related European association on the employee side 
– namely, ETF – and two on the employer side – namely, Europêche and COGECA – are 
particularly significant in the sea fisheries sector; they are listed by the European Commission as 
social partner organisations consulted under Article 154 of the TFEU. Hence, the following 
analysis will concentrate on these three organisations, while providing supplementary information 
on others which are linked to the sector’s national industrial relations actors.  
Membership domain 
ETF, which is affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), organises the 
whole transport sector and covers also fisheries. Therefore its membership domain overlaps with 
the sea fisheries sector. On the employers’ side, Europêche associates fishery enterprises in the 
European Unions, so that its representational domain largely coincides with the specific focus of 
the present study. COGECA organises agricultural cooperatives, so that its representation covers 
the whole agriculture sector. Both employer associations organise employer and business 
organisations. 
Membership composition 
In terms of membership composition, it should be noted that the countries covered by ETF and 
COGECA extend beyond the 22 countries examined in this study. However, the report will only 
consider the members in these 22 countries. 
For ETF, Table 12 documents a list of membership of sector-related trade unions. In the case of 
ETF, there is at least one affiliation in most of the countries under consideration. Sector-related 
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unions are not affiliates of ETF in Latvia, Romania and Slovenia. In general, this is linked to the 
fact that, in these cases, the relevant national organisations cover the agriculture sector. In some 
countries – such as Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, and Portugal – multiple memberships 
occur. 
On aggregate, ETF counts 25 direct affiliations from the countries under examination and three 
indirect ones. More than half of the trade unions listed in Table 6 and Table 7 are directly 
affiliated to ETF. From available data on the relative strength of sectoral membership of the 
national trade unions, one can conclude that ETF covers the sector’s most important labour 
representatives. Seventeen of the 28 direct and indirect members of ETF for which information is 
available are involved in collective bargaining related to the sea fisheries sector. They cover 
seven countries (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal). It can be 
noted, moreover, that the sectoral agreement which is applied in Finland in the sea fisheries 
sector, the Cargoship agreement, is actually signed by an affiliate of ETF, the Finnish Seamen’s 
Union (SMU) and the Cargoship Association, which are not covered by this study. This decision 
was made on the grounds that the agreement focuses on transport and it is applied to the sea 
fisheries employees (116 employees out of 364 workers) only for analogy. Moreover, neither of 
the two signatory organisations are involved in social dialogue in the sector. The only notable 
exceptions are the unions of the three countries where ETF has no sector-related affiliates, and 
collective bargaining is present in the sea fisheries sector. It should be noted, in fact, that the 
presence of collective bargaining at either sectoral or company-level was reported in 13 of the 22 
countries covered by the study. 
Table 13 lists the members of Europêche. Of the 18 countries with identified employer 
associations, Europêche has 18 direct affiliates in 11 countries (and three other organisations are 
linked to Europêche indirectly, through their affiliation to members, or by having affiliates among 
their members). Multiple membership is found in Spain, Italy and the UK. COGECA, whose 
member associations in the sea fisheries sector are listed in Table 14, has 15 affiliates in 11 
countries (considering both direct affiliations and indirect links). Multiple membership is found 
only in Italy. National organisations affiliated to both EU-level organisations can be found in 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. If we combine the two memberships, of the 18 countries for 
which employer associations could be identified in the sea fisheries sector, the only countries 
which are not covered by Europêche and COGECA are Portugal and Romania. From the 
available sectoral membership data of the respective organisations one can say that important 
national associations are affiliated. 
In Portugal and Slovenia, the employer associations which engage in collective bargaining are not 
affiliates of the two EU-level organisations. There are also some countries (Cyprus, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, and the UK) where the affiliate/s of Europêche and 
COGECA is/are not engaged in bargaining. Employer/business organisations which are not 
involved in collective bargaining may regard themselves as trade associations rather than as being 
actively involved in industrial relations. Of the affiliates of Europêche, at least nine are involved 
in sector-related collective bargaining. As for COGECA, five of the affiliates participate in 
sector-related collective bargaining. Taking into consideration the four common affiliates of the 
two EU-level organisations which engage in collective bargaining, 10 affiliates of the two 
organisations are parties to sector-related collective bargaining. 
Europêche covers, with its affiliates, collective bargaining in five countries; COGECA’s 
members do the same in three countries. If we take into consideration the three countries where 
both their affiliates (usually the same) take part in collective negotiations, we have a consolidated 
figure of five countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and Netherlands). It should be 
remembered that multiemployer bargaining is present in nine of the 22 countries covered by this 
study (see Table 10), including the already mentioned peculiarity of Finland. 
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Capacity to negotiate 
The third criterion of representativeness at the European level refers to the organisations’ capacity 
to negotiate on behalf of their members. ETF, Europêche and COGECA represent their members 
in matters of the European sectoral social dialogue. 
ETF has a permanent mandate to negotiate on behalf of its members, but decisions on strategies 
and agreements are always subject to the approval of the internal structures (in the case of sea 
fisheries, the competent body is the fisheries section). Moreover, ETF’s affiliates are always 
involved in any kind of continuing negotiations with employers. Europêche proceeds with an ad 
hoc mandate from its member organisations on a case by case basis 
As a final proof of the weight of ETF, Europêche and COPA-COGEPA, it is useful to look at 
other European organisations which may be important representatives of the sector. This can be 
done by reviewing the other European organisations to which the sector-related trade unions and 
employer associations are affiliated.  
For the trade unions, these affiliations are listed in Table 7. Accordingly, a number of European 
organisations other than ETF are associated with a significant proportion of both sector-related 
trade unions and countries. For reasons of brevity, only those European organisations which 
cover at least three countries are mentioned here. 
This criteria allows us to identify only one EU-level organisation, the European Federation of 
Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism Sectors and Allied Branches (EFFAT). 
EFFAT shows eight affiliations covering four countries. Apart from Italy, where the major trade 
unions are affiliated to both ETF and EFFAT, this situation corresponds to the country where the 
sea fisheries sector falls within the representational domain of agriculture organisations, on both 
sides of industry. It should be underlined that ETF and EFFAT can have common affiliates, but, 
in principle, these affiliates declare membership according to the relevant European sectoral 
federation which organises each specific sector of those they operate in, so that sea fisheries 
workers are generally declared only to ETF. As a consequence, genuinely relevant affiliations to 
EFFAT should be regarded as only those where sector-related unions which engage in collective 
bargaining covering the sea fisheries sector and are affiliated only to EFFAT, as in the cases of 
Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia. 
It should be noted that the affiliations listed in Table 7 may not necessarily be exhaustive. 
Nevertheless, and despite the large number of affiliations to European organisations other than 
ETF, this overview underlines the principal status of the latter association as the sector’s labour 
representative. 
An analogous review of the membership of the national employer/ business associations can be 
derived from Table 9. Most of them entertain rather few affiliations to European associations 
other than Europêche and COGECA. In fact, on the employers’ side the presence of COGECA 
covers the situations where agriculture is the reference sector for sea fisheries. Only a handful of 
other EU-level organisation is present and none of them covers three countries or more. 
In conclusion, ETF, Europêche, and COGECA appear to be the most important sector-related 
European organisations. 
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Commentary 
The sea fisheries sector is certainly an uncharacteristic sector, since it covers just a small segment 
of the labour market, is highly regulated – in terms of ‘effort limitation’ (that is restriction on the 
fleet that sets out to sea and the amount of time that it can spend fishing), fishing quotas, times 
and methods of fishing – and is characterised by the prevalence of self-employed fishermen, 
sometimes organised in cooperatives. Its small size and the predominence of self-employed 
workers are probably the main reasons for the polarisation of sectoral industrial relations, with 
many of the 25 countries studied having no collective bargaining. Collective agreements at any 
level – sectoral, territorial, and company – were reported only in 13 countries. Most of these show 
a well-established system of negotiation with high coverage rates, despite the usually small size 
in terms of employment. Policy making, because of its direct impact on the environment and 
fishing resources, is usually accompanied by consultation with sectoral interest organisations – 
even if there is no collective bargaining – and tripartite bodies are relatively widespread. 
Overall, ETF, Europêche and COGECA have to be regarded as the most important EU-wide 
representatives of the sector’s employers and employees.  
Roberto Pedersini, Università degli Studi di Milano  
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Annex: Tables 3 to 15 
 
 
Table 3: Total employers and employment in Sea fisheries, 1999 and 2009 
 Year Number of 
companies 
Total 
employment 
Male 
employment 
Female 
employment 
Total sectoral  
employment 
as % of total 
employment in 
economy 
BE 1999 n.a. 691 n.a. n.a. 0
BE 2009 86 551 412 139 0
BG 1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
BG 2003 n.a. 3,430 n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY 1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY 2009 115 138 n.a. n.a. 0.04
DE 1999 n.a. 2,515 1,965 55 0
DE 2009 n.a. 1,150 n.a. n.a. 0
DK 2000 1,860 4,605 4,473 132 0
DK 2009 1,061 2,088 2,008 80 0
EE 2005 121 2,700 2,500 n.a. 0.4
EE 2007 86 2,100 1,600 n.a. 0.3
ES 2001 n.a. 63,916 54,328 9,589 0
ES 2008 n.a. 47,751 39,631 7,982 0
FI 1999 442 172 145 27 0
FI 2009 303 364 321 43 0
FR 1999 5,971 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR 2007 5,187 25,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
GR 2008 899 11,127 10,000 1,127 0
GR 2009 1,076 12,338 11,200 1,138 0
IE 2003 n.a. 4,000 n.a. n.a. 0
IE 2009 n.a. 2100 n.a. n.a. 0
IT 2004 6,748 35,069 30,860 4,209 0.14
IT 2008 8,897 29,349 25,827 3,522 0.12
LT 2006 152 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
LT 2010 134 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
LV 1999 119 1,795 1,563 232 0.23
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LV 2009 73 829 700 129 0.1
MT 2002 488 552 530 22 0
MT 2008 564 1,203 1,163 40 0
NL 1999 470 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NL 2009 395 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL 2000 1,004 7,007 n.a. n.a. 0
PL 2009 1,181 3,004 n.a. n.a. 0
PT 1998 195 5,078 4,435 643 0
PT 2008 1,190 8,783 7,712 1,071 0
RO 1999 n.a. 5,000 n.a. n.a. 0.06
RO 2008 28 3,000 n.a. n.a. 0.03
SE 1999 826 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SE 2009 1,255 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SI 1999 90 193 178 15 0.025
SI 2009 56 105 94 11 0.012
UK 1999 n.a. 13,374 12,861 513 1.0
UK 2009 1,715 10,256 10,256 0 1.0
‘0’ indicates that there is actual employment, but it represents an unspecified figure 
below 1% of total employment 
n.a. = not available 
Source: EIRO national centres (2011), European Parliament (2011) for Bulgaria. 
Reference years are for employment data; those for number of companies may vary. 
For detailed description of sources and reference years for number of companies 
please refer to the national reports. 
Table 4: Total employees in Sea fisheries, 1998 and 2008 
 Year Total employees Male employees Female 
employees 
Total sectoral  
employees as % 
of total 
employees in 
economy 
BE 1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
BE 2009 473 352 121 0
BG 1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
BG 2009 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY 1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CY 2009 34 n.a. n.a. 0
DE 1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
DE 2009 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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DK 2000 2,464 2,388 76 0
DK 2009 881 828 53 0
EE 2005 1,100 n.a. n.a. 0.2
EE 2007 1,300 n.a. n.a. 0.2
ES 2001 39,059 36,487 2,572 0
ES 2008 27,329 25,432 1,897 0
FI 1999 117 94 23 0
FI 2009 116 92 14 0
FR 1999 21,666 n.a. n.a. 0
FR 2007 16,126 n.a. n.a. 0
GR 2008 3,451 2,500 951 0
GR 2009 3,705 2,700 1,005 0
IE 2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IE 2009 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IT 2004 34,232 31,493 2,739 0.19
IT 2008 28,649 26,357 2,292 0.14
LT 2006 2,072 n.a. n.a. 0
LT 2010 1,463 n.a. n.a. 0
LV 1999 1,758 1,531 227 0.22
LV 2009 824 695 129 0.1
MT 2002 70 n.a. n.a. 0
MT 2008 221 n.a. n.a. 0
NL 1999 2,100 1,800 300 0
NL 2009 700 600 100 0
PL 2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL 2009 6,000 n.a. n.a. 0
PT 1998 4,933 4,307 626 0
PT 2008 8,032 7,019 1,013 0
RO 1999 4,000 n.a. n.a. 0.08
RO 2008 2,000 n.a. n.a. 0.04
SE 1999 325 n.a. n.a. 0
SE 2009 269 n.a. n.a. 0
SI 1999 78 n.a. n.a. 0.012
SI 2009 39 n.a. n.a. 0.005
UK 1999 2,524 2,289 235 0
UK 2009 4,343 4,343 0 0
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‘0’ indicates that there are sectoral employees, but they represent an unspecified 
figure below 1% of total employment 
n.a. = not available 
Source: EIRO national centres (2011). 
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Table 5: Determining the ‘sector relatedness’ of an organisation 
Scope Question in the standardised 
questionnaire  
Possible 
answers 
Notes  
Domain of the 
organisation 
within the 
sector 
Does the union/employer 
organisation’s domain embrace 
potentially all employees in the 
sea fisheries sector?
Yes/No This question has not been asked 
directly in the questionnaire, but is 
considered to be ‘Yes’ if the replies to all 
of the five following sub-questions are 
‘yes. It is considered to be ‘no’, if at 
least one of the replies is ’no’.
  
…cover ‘basically all’ groups of 
employees (min.: blue collar, 
white collar) in the Sea fisheries 
sector?
Yes/No This question refers to the organisation’s 
scope of the sector with regard to 
different types of employment contracts. 
As the contractual forms are rather 
heterogeneous, the minimum 
requirement to answer this question with 
‘yes’ would be the fact that both blue-
collar and white-collar workers are 
potentially covered by the organisation’s 
domain.  
…cover the  ‘whole’ Sea fisheries 
sector
in terms of economic activities, 
(i.e. including all sub-activities)
Yes/No This question refers to the economic 
sub- activities of the NACE code chosen. 
In the spreadsheet part of the 
questionnaire, correspondents have 
been provided a detailed breakdown of 
sub-activities to the four-digit level.  
… cover employees in all types of 
companies (all types of 
ownership: private, public…) in 
the Sea fisheries sector?
Yes/No This question refers to ownership. Some 
organisations might limit, for instance, 
their domain to domestically owned, or to 
public sector companies/employees 
only.  
… cover employees in 
enterprises of all sizes in the Sea 
fisheries sector?
Yes/No Often, organisations limit their domain to 
enterprises by size class (for 
example,SMEs only). 
…cover all occupations in the 
Sea fisheries sector?
Yes/No Some organisations (notably trade 
unions) limit their domain to certain 
occupations only. This sub-question 
intends to identify these occupational 
organisations.
Domain of the 
organisation 
outside the 
sector 
Does the union also represent 
members outside the sea 
fisheries sector?
Yes/No This question is again being asked 
directly to the correspondents.
Source: Standardised Excel-based questionnaire, sent to EIRO National 
correspondents (2011). 
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Table 6: Domain coverage and membership of trade unions in sea fisheries, 
2009/10 
 Union Membership Domain coveragea
Membership 
Members 
total 
Members 
active
Members 
sector 
Members 
sector 
active
Female 
member-
ship (%) of 
total 
member-
ship
BE* ACV-Transcom Overlap Voluntary 84613 65529 300 200 14
BE* BTB-UBOT Overlap Voluntary n.a. 40000 300 200 n.a.
BE* ACLVB-CGSLB Overlap Voluntary 260000 n.a. 30 20 n.a.
BG Seamen’s 
Syndicate 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
DE ver.di Overlap Voluntary 2138200 n.a. 2000 n.a. 51
DK 3F Sectional overlap Voluntary n.a. 362700 n.a. 1000 n.a.
ES* FSC-CC.OO Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES* TCM-UGT Sectional overlap Voluntary 325000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES* ELA Hainbat Sectional overlap Voluntary 22937 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES* FGAMT-CIG Sectional overlap n.a. 9309 8004 9309 843 39
FR* FMNS-CGT Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR* FGTE-CFDT Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR* FFPSM-M Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR* SMPP-FNAM Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR* SMP-CFTC Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR* FEETS-FO Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IE SIPTU Sectional overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IT* Flai-Cgil Overlap Voluntary 283642 n.a. 283642 n.a. n.a.
IT* Fai-Cisl Overlap Voluntary 199000 199000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
IT* Uila-Pesca Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IT* FISALS 
CONFSAL 
Sectional overlap Voluntary 7500 6500 500 500 55
IT* PESCA 
CONFSAL 
Overlap Voluntary 1500 1500 1500 1500 25
IT* FESICA 
CONFSAL 
Overlap Voluntary 375000 375000 1560 1560 40
LV LLPNA-LATU Overlap Voluntary 1938 1852 140 140 64
NL CNV Vakmensen Overlap Voluntary 140000 140000 170 170 n.a.
PL* KSM MiR NSZZ 
Solidarność 
Overlap Voluntary 6000 3500 1000 500 3
PL* FZZ MiR Overlap Voluntary 3443 2200 n.a. 500 n.a.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012 
28 
 
 Union Membership Domain coveragea
Membership 
Members 
total 
Members 
active
Members 
sector 
Members 
sector 
active
Female 
member-
ship (%) of 
total 
member-
ship
PT* SIMAMEVIP  Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT* STPN  Sectionalism Voluntary 200 200 200 200 n.a.
PT* STPDC  Sectionalism Voluntary 20 20 20 20 n.a.
PT* STPC  Sectionalism Voluntary 100 100 100 100 n.a.
PT* SLPPA  Congruence Voluntary 200 200 200 200 n.a.
PT* STPS  Sectionalism Voluntary 150 150 150 150 n.a.
PT* UGT Pescas Congruence Voluntary 50 50 50 50 n.a.
PT* SINDEPESCAS  Overlap Voluntary 300 300 300 300 n.a.
PT* SITEMAQ  Sectional overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT* SINCOMAR  Sectional overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT* SEMM  Sectional overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT* Oficiaismar  Sectional overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT* SOEMMM Sectional overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
RO* AGROSTAR Overlap Voluntary 50000 50000 0 0 40
RO* CERES Overlap Voluntary 42000 42000 0 0 30
SI* TUAFIS Overlap Voluntary 11500 11500 0 0 50
SI* TUSF Overlap Voluntary 4000 4000 0 0 40
UK RMT Overlap Voluntary 79499 n.a. 0 0 11
a = Please find a more detailed description of the trade unions’ membership domain 
with regard to the sector in Table I in the ANNEX. 
* = Domain overlap with other sector-related trade unions. 
n.a. = not available 
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Table 7: Density, collective bargaining, consultation and affiliations of trade 
unions in sea fisheries, 2009/10 
 Trade unions Union densities (%) CB SD National 
affiliation 
European 
affiliation Domain 
total 
Domain 
active 
Sector Sector 
active
Sector
al 
domai
n
Sectoral 
domain 
active
BE CSV-Transcom n.a. 26-50 n.a. 26-50 n.a. 26-50 Yes Yes ACV-CSC ETF 
BE BTB-UBOT n.a. 26-50 n.a. 26-50 n.a. 26-50 Yes Yes ABVV-FGTB ETF 
BE ACLVB-CGSLB n.a. 10-25 n.a. 10-25 n.a. 10-25 Yes Yes  ETF 
BG Seamen’s Syndicate n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ETF 
DE ver.di n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes DGB ETF, UNI-
Europa 
DK 3F n.a. 80 n.a. n.a. n.a. 50 Yes Yes LO ETF; NTF; 
EMF; EFFAT; 
EPSU; 
EMCEF; 
EWB; UNI 
Europa 
ES FSC-CC.OO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No Yes  ETF 
ES TCM-UGT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No Yes  ETF 
ES ELA Hainbat n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No Yes  ETF 
ES FGAMT-CIG n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.    ETF 
FR FMNS-CGT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes CGT ETF 
FR FGTE-CFDT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  ETF 
FR FFSPM-M n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes   
FR SMPP-FNAM n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  ETF 
FR SMP-CFTC n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  ETF 
FR FEETS-FO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  ETF 
IE SIPTU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  ETF 
IT Flai-Cgil 19.2 19.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Cgil ETF, EFFAT 
IT Fai-Cisl 14.2 14.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Cisl EFT, EFFAT 
IT Uila-Pesca n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Uil ETF, EFFAT 
IT FISALS CONFSAL n.a. n.a. 1.7 1.7 n.a. n.a. Yes No Confsal CESI 
IT PESCA CONFSAL 4.3 4.3 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 Yes Yes Confsal CESI 
IT FESICA CONFSAL 18.8 18.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 Yes Yes Confsal CESI 
LV LLPNA-LATU 1.6 1.6 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 No Yes LBAS EFFAT 
NL CNV Vakmensen n.a. n.a. 24.0 30.0 n.a. n.a. Yes Yes CNV ETF 
PL KSM MiR NSZZ 
Solidarność 
n.a. 10-25 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 No Yes NSZZ 
Solidarność 
ETF 
PL FZZ MiR n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 No Yes OPZZ ETF 
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 Trade unions Union densities (%) CB SD National 
affiliation 
European 
affiliation Domain 
total 
Domain 
active 
Sector Sector 
active
Sector
al 
domai
n
Sectoral 
domain 
active
PT SIMAMEVIP  n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 Yes No FSSP; CGTP  
PT STPN  6.7 6.7 2.5 2.5 6.7 6.7 Yes No FSSP; CGTP  
PT STPDC  0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.7 Yes No FSSP; CGTP  
PT STPC  3.3 3.3 1.2 1.2 3.3 3.3 Yes No FSSP; CGTP  
PT SLPPA  2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 Yes No FSSP; CGTP  
PT STPS  5.0 5.0 1.9 1.9 5.0 5.0 Yes No FSSP; CGTP  
PT UGT Pescas 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Yes No UGT  
PT SINDEPESCAS  3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 Yes No UGT  
PT SITEMAQ  n.a. 10-25 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 Yes No FESMAR; 
UGT 
(ETF) 
PT SINCOMAR  n.a. 10-25 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 Yes No FESMAR; 
UGT 
(ETF) 
PT SEMM  n.a. 10-25 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 Yes No FESMAR; 
UGT 
(ETF) 
PT Oficiaismar  n.a. 10-25 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 No No CGTP; 
FECTRANS 
ETF 
PT SOEMMM n.a. 10-25 n.a. 0-9 n.a. 0-9 No No UGT ETF 
RO AGROSTAR 31.4 31.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Yes Yes BNS EFFAT 
RO CERES 28.0 28.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Yes Yes Cartel Alfa EFFAT 
SI TUAFIS 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Yes Yes ZSSS EUL; EFFAT 
SI TUSF 9.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 No Yes   
UK RMT n.a. n.a. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 No n/a TUC ETF 
CB = Collective Barganining, SD = Social dialogue, consultation 
a = National affiliations put in italics; for the national level, only cross-sectoral (i.e. 
peak-level) associations are listed; for the European level sectoral associations only; 
affiliation put in parenthesis means indirect affiliation via higher-order unit. 
n.a. = not available 
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Table 8: Domain coverage and membership of employer/business 
organisations in sea fisheries, 2009/10 
 Employer Organisation 
Domain 
coveragea Type 
Membership 
Companies Companies in sector Employees 
Employees 
in sector
BE Rederscentrale Congruence Voluntary 86 86 450 450
CY Panagrotikos 
Farmers’ Union 
n.a. Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
DE DFV Overlap Voluntary n.a. n.a. 3,000 n.a.
DE DHV Sectionalism Voluntary 4 4 260 260
DK Danish 
Fishermen's 
Association 
Sectionalism Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
EE EPKK n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES CEPESCA Sectionalism Voluntary 1,625 1,600 21,300 21,000
ES FEOPE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES FEABP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES FNCP Sectionalism Voluntary n.a. n.a. 225 n.a.
ES UNACOMAR Sectionalism Voluntary 200 n.a. 10,000 n.a.
FR UAPF Congruence Voluntary 20 20 2,500 2,500
FR SNCEP Congruence Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR COOP 
MARITIME 
Congruence Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR FFSPM Congruence Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
GR PEPMA Sectionalism n.a. 400 400 10,000 10,000
GR PASEGES n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IE IFPO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IE FIF Sectionalism Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IT FEDERPESCA Overlap Voluntary 2,500 2,200 20,000 18,000
IT FEDERCOOPE
SCA 
Sectional 
overlap 
Voluntary 472 430 20,475 n.a.
IT LEGAPESCA Sectional 
overlap 
Voluntary 477 376 15,000 12,000
IT AGCI AGRITAL Sectional 
overlap 
Voluntary 1,001 600 12,619 7,400
IT ANAPI PESCA Sectional 
overlap 
Voluntary 1,800 1,620 2,800 2,592
IT UNCI PESCA Sectional 
overlap 
Voluntary 450 450 5,500 5,500
MT KM Sectional 
overlap 
Voluntary 60 2 4,500 599
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 Employer Organisation 
Domain 
coveragea Type 
Membership 
Companies Companies in sector Employees 
Employees 
in sector
NL RVZ Sectionalism Voluntary 4 4 477 477
NL SNV n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PL PAOP Sectionalism Voluntary 2 2 n.a. n.a.
PT ADAPI Sectionalism Voluntary 43 43 2,200 2,200
RO FNPAR Overlap Voluntary 28 0 13,600 0
SE SFR Overlap Voluntary 1,330 1,223 n.a. n.a.
SI CCIS-CAFE Overlap Voluntary 245 3 12,000 10
SI SCAF Overlap Mixed 
(Mandatory 
over a 
certain size 
threshold) 
111,500 15 115,000 35
UK NFFO Sectionalism Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
UK SFF Sectionalism Voluntary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 
a = Please find a more detailed description of the employer organisations’ 
membership domain with regard to the sector in Table II in the ANNEX 
n.a. = not available 
Table 9: Density, collective bargaining, consultation and affiliations of 
employer/ business organisations in sea fisheries, 2009/10 
 Employer 
organisation 
Density (%) CB SD National 
affiliations 
European 
affiliationsa Companies Employees 
Doma
in 
Secto
r 
Sector
al 
domai
n 
Doma
in 
Secto
r 
Sectora
l 
domain
BE Rederscentrale 100 100 100 90-100 90-100 90-100 Yes Yes  Europêche; EAPO 
CY Panagrotikos 
Farmers’ Union 
n.a. 60 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No No  COGECA 
DE DFV 91-100 n.a. n.a. 91-100 n.a. n.a. No Yes Deutscher 
Raiffeisen 
Verband 
Europêche; 
(COGECA) 
DE DHV 91-100 n.a. n.a. 91-100 n.a. n.a. Yes Yes DFV (Europêche) 
DK Danish Fishermen's 
Association 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes None Europêche 
EE EPKK n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  COGECA 
ES CEPESCA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No Yes CEOE (Europêche) 
ES FEOPE n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. CEPESCA Europêche 
ES FEABP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. CEPESCA Europêche 
ES FNCP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No Yes  Europêche 
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 Employer 
organisation 
Density (%) CB SD National 
affiliations 
European 
affiliationsa Companies Employees 
Doma
in 
Secto
r 
Sector
al 
domai
n 
Doma
in 
Secto
r 
Sectora
l 
domain
ES UNACOMAR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10 10 No Yes CEPES COGECA 
FR UAPF 0.4 0.4 0.4 10 n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  Europêche 
FR SNCEP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  FEAP 
FR COOP MARITIME n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  COGECA 
FR FFSPM n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes  Europêche  
GR PEPMA 51-75 51-75 51-75 55 70.0 14.0 No No None Europêche; 
MEDISAMAK 
GR PASEGES n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  COGECA 
IE IFPO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. FIF COGECA 
IE FIF n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No Yes  (COGECA) 
IT FEDERPESCA 50.0 24.7 44.0 66.7 n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Confindustria. 
Federmare. 
Federop.it 
Europêche; 
MEDISAMAK 
IT FEDERCOOPPESCA n.a. 4.8 n.a. n.a. 41.89 n.a. Yes Yes Confcooperativ
e 
(COGECA); 
Europêche 
IT LEGAPESCA n.a. 4.23 n.a. n.a. 25.83 n.a. Yes Yes Legacoop (COGECA); 
Europêche 
IT AGCI AGRITAL n.a. 6.74 7.06 n.a. 9.05 22.56 Yes yes Agci COGECA; 
Europêche 
IT ANAPI PESCA n.a. 18.21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Confapi  
IT UNCI PESCA n.a. 5.06 19.2 n.a. 49.7 100 Yes Yes Unci  
MT KM 100 0.4 100 100 68 91-100 No Yes UHM CoopsEurope; 
CECOP; COGECA 
NL SNV n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  Europêche;  
COGECA 
NL RVZ 91-100 1 91-100 91-100 0-9 0-9 Yes Yes SNV (Europêche); 
(COGECA) 
PL PAOP 66 0-9 66 27.40 55.00 No Yes None Europêche 
PT ADAPI 21.50 3.60 21.50 55.00 0 0 Yes No None None 
RO FNPAR 66.18 0 0 30 n.a. n.a. Yes Yes CPISC  
SE SFR 76-90 91-100 91-100 25 9 No Yes None Europêche 
SI CCIS-CAFE 7 5 5 52 90 90 Yes Yes CCIS CIAA 
SI SCAF 99 27 27 85 51-75 51-75 No Yes  COGECA 
UK NFFO 26-50 26-50 26-50 51-75 51-75 51-75 No Yes MPA Fishing 
Coalition. UK 
Marine 
Stakeholders 
Forum 
Europêche 
UK SFF 26-50 26-50 26-50 51-75 n.a. n.a. No Yes n.a. Europêche 
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CB = Collective Barganining, SD = Social dialogue, consultation 
a = National affiliations put in italics; for the national level, only cross-sectoral (i.e. 
peak-level) associations are listed; for the European level sectoral associations only; 
affiliation put in parenthesis means indirect affiliation via higher-order unit. 
Note: The figures have rounded in all cases. Densities reported as 0% hence refer to 
a figure of 0.49% to more than 0%. 
n.a. = not available 
 
Table 10: System of sectoral collective bargaining (2009/10) 
 
CBC (%) 
(estimates) 
Share of MEB in total 
CBC (%) (estimates) Extension practices
a 
BE 100 100b 2 
CY No collective bargaining   
DE 15 0  
DK >50 100 0 
EE n.a.   
ES n.a. 0d  
FI 100 100 2 
FR 100 100b 1 
GR 
No collective 
bargainingc 
  
IE n.a. 0d  
IT 90 100b (2) 
LT No collective bargaining   
LV n.a. 0d  
MT No collective bargaining   
NL 68 100e 0 
PL n.a. 0d  
PT 84 77b 1 
RO 100 100 2 
SE No collective bargaining 0  
SI 64 100 0 
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UK No collective 
bargaining 
  
CBC = collective bargaining coverage: employees covered as a percentage of the 
total number of employees in the sector 
MEB = multi-employer bargaining relative to single-employer bargaining 
SEB = single-employer bargaining 
Extension practices (including functional equivalents to extension provisions, i.e. 
obligatory membership and labour court rulings): 
a = 0 = no practice, 1 = limited/exceptional, 2 = pervasive. Cases of functional 
equivalents are put in parentheses. 
b = supplemented/complemented by single-employer agreements 
c = The only exception is the employment contract concluded with Egyptians workers 
(seasonal workers), which is a prerequisite in order for an Egyptian fisherman to be 
granted a residence permit as well as to be registered with the Agricultural Insurance 
Organization 
d = Data on CBC is not available, but the presence of single-employer agreements is 
reported 
e= Sub-sector of trawlers including 4 employers and 14 vessels 
n.a. = not available 
n/a = not applicable 
 
Table 11:  Tripartite sector-specific boards of public policy (200/10) 
 Name of the body and scope of activity Origin Trade 
unions 
participating 
Business 
associations 
participating 
BE Technical working group on fisheries of the Strategic Advisory 
Council for Agriculture and Fisheries. Consultation on regional 
policies in Flanders 
Statutory ACV-Transcom 
BTB-UBOT 
ACLVB-CGSLB 
Rederscentrale 
EE Estonian Qualifications Authority (Kutsekoda), Food Industry 
and Agriculture Professional Council 
Statutory Estonian Fishers’ 
Association 
(Eesti 
Kalapüüdjate 
Ühing)a 
Estonian 
Association of 
Fishery (Kalaliit) 
and Estonian 
Chamber of 
Agriculture and 
Commerce 
(EPKK) 
ES Marine Social Institute (Insituto Social de la Marina) Statutory body 
part of the 
Ministry of 
Labour 
CCOO 
UGT 
CIG 
ELA 
CEOE 
IT Central Advisory Commission for Fishing and Aquaculture Statutory at the 
Ministry of 
Ministry of 
Agricultural 
Policies and 
Forestry 
Flai 
Fai 
Uila 
Federpesca 
Federcoopesca 
Lega Pesca 
Agci Agrital 
Anapi Pesca 
LV Fisheries Consultative Council Statutory at the 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
LLPNA LZA 
PL Tripartite Team for Seafaring and Sea Fishery (Zespół 
Trójstronny ds. Żeglugi i Rybołówstwa Morskiego) 
Agreement. It 
was established 
KSM MiR NSZZ 
Solidarność 
ZAP 
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within the 
Tripartite 
Commission for 
Socio-Economic 
Affairs (Komisja 
Trójstronna ds. 
Społeczno-
Gospodarczych, 
TK) 
FZZ MiR (OPZZ) 
The Nationwide 
Trade Union of 
Officers and 
Seafarers 
(Ogólnopolski 
Związek 
Zawodowy 
Oficerów i 
Marynarzy, OZZ 
OiM) 
Trade Unions’ 
Forum (Forum 
Związków 
Zawodowych, 
FZZ) 
RO Commission for social dialogue Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (Ministerul Agriculturii şi Dezvoltării Rurale, 
MADR) 
Statutory AGROSTAR, 
CERES 
FNPAR 
SI The Council of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Agreement TUAFIS CCIS-CAFE 
The Slovenian 
Employers’ 
Association 
The Agricultural 
Institute of 
Slovenia  
a It is not a trade union, but an employee representative 
 
Table 12: ETF Membership related to Sea Fisheries (2011)+ 
 Members 
BE ACV-CSC Transcom 
BE BTB-ABVV 
BE CGSLB 
BG Seamen’s Syndicate 
DE Ver.di 
DK 3F 
ES FSC-CC.OO 
ES FGAMT-CIG 
ES ELA Hainbat 
ES TCM – UGT 
FR CFTC 
FR CGT Maritime 
FR FGTE-CFDT 
FR FO-FEETS 
IT FAI-CISL 
IT FLAI-CGIL 
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IT UILA-PESCA 
NL CNV Vakmensen 
PL NSZZ Maritime 
PL FZZ MIR (SFTUF) 
PT FESMAR 
PT Oficiaismar 
PT SOEMMM 
UK Unite the Union 
UK RMT 
+ Membership list confined to the sector-related associations of the countries under 
consideration 
* Involved in sector-related collective bargaining 
** No information available on collective bargaining involvement 
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Table 13: Europêche Membership (2011)+ 
 Members 
BE Rederscentrale 
DE Deutscher Fischerei Verband 
DK Danmarks Fiskeriforening 
ES Federación  Española de Organizaciones Pesqueras – FEOPE 
ES Federación Española de Armadores de Buques de Pesca – FEABP 
ES Federación Nacional de Cofradías de Pescadores 
FR Union des Armateurs à la Pêche de France 
FR Fédération Française des Syndicats Professionnels Maritimes 
GR PEPMA Panhellenic Union of Middle Range Fisheries  Shipowners 
IT Federazione Nazionale delle Imprese di Pesca - FEDERPESCA 
IT Confederazione Cooperative Italiane – FEDERCOOPESCA 
IT Lega Nazionale Cooperative e Mutue  - LEGAPESCA 
IT Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane - AGCI AGRITAL 
NL Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij 
PL North Atlantic Producer Organisations 
SE Sveriges Fiskares Riksförbund 
UK National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations 
UK Scottish Fishermen’s Federation 
 + Membership list confined to the sector-related associations of the countries under 
consideration; associations in parentheses are indirectly affiliated to Europêche via 
higher-order units 
* Involved in sector-related collective bargaining 
** Collective bargaining involvement via lower-level unit(s) 
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Table 14: COGECA Membership related to Sea Fisheries (2011)+ 
 Members 
CY Panagrotikos Farmers’ Union 
DE Deutscher Fischerei Verband (through the Deutscher Raiffeisen Verband) 
EE Estonian Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce (EPKK) 
ES Unión Nacional de Cooperativas del Mar de España (UNACOMAR) 
FR Coopération Maritime 
GR Confédération Panhellénique des Unions des Coopératives Agricoles (Paseges) 
IE Irish Fish Producers’ Organisation (IFPO) 
IT Confederazione Cooperative Italiane (FEDERCOOPESCA) 
IT Lega Nazionale Cooperative e Mutue (LEGAPESCA) 
IT Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane – AGCI AGRITAL 
MT Kooperativi Malta 
NL Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij 
SI Chamber for Agriculture and Forestry of Slovenia 
 + Membership list confined to the sector-related associations of the countries under 
consideration; associations in parentheses are indirectly affiliated to COGECA via 
higher-order units 
* Involved in sector-related collective bargaining 
** Collective bargaining involvement via lower-level unit(s) 
 
Table 15: List of organisations 
 Abbreviation Name 
Supranational level 
  AEPM Association Européenne des Producteurs de Molusques 
  BSRAC  Baltic Sea Regional Advisory Council 
  CECOP The European Confederation of Workers’ Cooperatives, 
Social Cooperatives and Social and Participative 
Enterprises 
  CIAA European Confederation of Food and Drink Industries 
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  COGECA General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in 
the European Union 
  CoopsEurope Cooperatives Europe 
  COPA-COGECA Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations - 
General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in 
the European Union 
  EAPO European Association of Fish Producers Organisations 
  ESCA European Shipowners Community Associations 
  ETF European Transport Workers' Federation  
  Europêche Association of national organisations of fishing 
enterprises in the EU 
  FEAP Federation of European Aquaculture Producers 
  GEOPA-COPA Employers’ Group of Professional Agricultural 
Organisations in the European Union 
  ICA Coop International Cooperative Alliance 
  ICFA International Coalition of Fisheries Associations 
  ITF International Transport Workers' Federation 
  LDRAC LD Regional Advisory Council 
  Medisamak Association des professionnels du secteur de la pêche 
des pays riverains de la Méditerranée  
  North Sea RAC North Sea Regional Advisory Council 
  NSRAC North Sea Regional Advisory Council 
  NWWRAC North Western Waters Regional Advisory Council 
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  NWWRAC North Western Waters Regional Advisory Council 
  Pelagic AC Pelagic AC 
  PRAC Pelagic Regional Advisory Council 
  RAC MED Regional Advisory Council for the Mediterranean 
National level 
BE Rederscentrale Central of Shipowners (Rederscentrale) 
BG Seamen’s Syndicate Seamen’s Syndicate 
BG KSNB Confederation of Independent Syndicates in Bulgaria 
CY PANAGROTIKOS Panagrotikos Farmers’ Union 
DE DFV Deutsche Fischereiverband 
DE DHV Deutsche Hochseefischereiverband 
DK DF Danmarks Fiskeriforening (Danish Fishermen's 
Association) 
EE EPKK Estonian Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce 
EE EKL Estonian Fish Breeders’ Association 
EE Kalaliit Estonian Association of Fishery 
ES CEPESCA Fishing Spanish Confederation 
ES FEOPE Federación Española de Organizaciones Pesqueras 
ES FEABP Federación Española de Armadores de Buques de Pesca 
ES FNCP National Federation of Fisherman’s Association 
ES UNACOMAR National Union of Sea Cooperatives 
ES CEOE Confederación Española de Organizaciones 
Empresariales  
ES CEPES Confederación Empresarial Española de Economía 
Social  
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FR CGT General Confederation of Labour (Confédération 
générale du travail) 
FR UAPF Union des Armateurs à la Pêche de France 
FR SNCEP Syndicat National des Chefs d'Entreprise à la pêche 
Maritime 
FR COOP MARITIME Cooperative Maritime 
FR FFSPM Fédération Française des Syndicats Professionnels 
Maritimes 
FR FMNS-CGT Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Maritime 
FR FGTE-CFDT Fédération Générales des Transport et de l’Equipement 
FR SMP-CFTC Syndicat national des Marins Pêcheurs 
FR FEETS-FO Fédération de l’Equipement de l’Environnement des 
Transports & des Services 
FR SMPP-FNAM Syndicat méditerranéen des pêcheurs professionnels - 
Fédération nationale des activités 
IE IFPO Irish Fish Producers’ Organisation 
IE FIF Federation of Irish Fishermen 
IT FEDERPESCA Federazione Nazionale delle Imprese di Pesca 
IT FEDERCOOPPESCA Confederazione Cooperative Italiane 
IT LEGAPESCA Associazione Nazionale delle Cooperative di Pesca 
IT AGCI AGRITAL Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane 
IT ANAPI PESCA Associazione Nazionale Autonoma Piccoli Imprenditori 
della Pesca 
IT Unci Pesca Unione Nazionale Cooperative Italiane Pesca 
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IT Confindustria Italian Employers' Confederation 
IT Federmare Italian Fishing and Sea Confederation 
IT Federop Federazione delle organizzazioni di produttori della 
pesca e dell’acquacoltura italiane (Italian Fishing and 
Aquaculture Federation) 
IT Confcooperative Confederazione Cooperative Italiane, (Confederation of 
Italian Cooperatives) 
IT Legacoop Lega nazionale delle cooperative (National Association 
of cooperatives) 
IT Agci Associazione generale cooperative italiane (General 
Association of Italian Cooperatives) 
IT Confapi Confederazione italiana della piccola e media industria 
(Italian Confederation of Small and Medium-sized 
Industry)  
IT Unci Unione Nazionale Cooperative Italiane (National Union 
of Cooperatives) 
MT KM Koperattivi Malta 
MT UHM Union of United Workers 
NL RVZ Redersvereniging voor de Zeevisserij 
NL SNV Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij 
PL ZAP Polish Shipowners Association (Związek Armatorów 
Polskich) 
PL PAOP North Atlantic Producers Organisation 
(Północnoatlantycka Organizacja Producentów) 
PL Pracodawcy RP Employers of Poland 
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012 
44 
 
PT ADAPI Associação dos Armadores das Pescas Industriais 
(Association of Industrial Fishery) 
PT CONFAGRI Confederacão Nacional das Cooperativas Agrícolas e do 
Credito Agrícola de Portugal (National Confederation of 
Agricultural Cooperatives and of Agricultural Credit of 
Portugal) 
RO FNPAR The National Agriculture Producer Federation from 
Romania (Federaţia Naţională a Producătorilor Agricoli 
din România) 
RO CPISC Industry, Services and Commerce Employers' 
Confederation from Romania (Confederaţia Patronală 
din Industriei Servicii şi Comerţ din România) 
SE SFR Sveriges fiskares riksförbund 
SI CCIS-CAFE Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia – 
Chamber of Agricultural and Food Enterprises 
SI SCAF Slovenia’s Chamber of Agriculture and Forestry  
SI CCIS Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia 
UK NFFO National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations 
UK SFF Scottish Fishermen's Federation 
UK MPA Fishing Coalition Marine Protected Areas Fishing Coalition 
UK   UK Marine Stakeholders Forum 
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